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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
In Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 
863 (3d Cir. 1984), we held that a district court must consider 
six factors before it may dismiss a case as a sanction before trial 
on the merits.  This appeal requires us to decide whether Poulis 
applies in the post-trial context.  We hold it does not. 
                                                                                                             




In February 2008, Tera Knoll filed suit against the City of 
Allentown in the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County, 
Pennsylvania following her termination from the City‘s Parks 
Department.  Knoll alleged claims of gender discrimination, 
harassment, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 951 et seq.  Allentown removed the case to the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 
After the District Court granted in part and denied in part 
Allentown‘s motion for summary judgment, a jury trial on the 
remaining claims commenced in June 2010.  At the close of 
Knoll‘s case, the District Court granted in part Allentown‘s 
motion for judgment as a matter of law and dismissed Knoll‘s 
gender discrimination claim.  The jury later returned a verdict in 
favor of Allentown on the harassment and retaliation claims. 
On July 21, 2010, Knoll filed a motion for a new trial.  
On August 4, 2010, Allentown filed a response, arguing that the 
motion was meritless and also noting that Knoll had failed to 
comply with Eastern District of Pennsylvania Local Rule of 
Civil Procedure 7.1(e), which requires a litigant either to order a 
trial transcript or to file a verified motion showing good cause to 
be excused from that requirement within fourteen days of filing 
a post-trial motion.  On September 9, 2010, the District Court 
dismissed Knoll‘s motion for a new trial for lack of prosecution, 
citing Knoll‘s noncompliance with Local Rule 7.1(e), as well as 
Knoll‘s failure to correct that noncompliance even after 
Allentown raised the issue in its response to the motion for a 
new trial.  Knoll then filed a motion for reconsideration on 
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September 17, 2010.  On September 27, 2010, Allentown filed a 
response to the motion for reconsideration along with a motion 
for sanctions, arguing that Knoll‘s motion for a new trial and 
motion for reconsideration were frivolous.  Knoll responded to 
the motion for sanctions on October 7, 2010. 
On December 7, 2010, the District Court held a hearing 
on Allentown‘s motion for sanctions.  On September 30, 2011, 
the District Court denied the motion for sanctions and issued a 
memorandum opinion.  Therein, the District Court noted that it 
believed Knoll‘s motions were frivolous but declined to order 
sanctions both because Allentown did not comply with Rule 
11‘s safe harbor provision, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2), and 
because it was not convinced that Knoll‘s conduct was 
sanctionable under the law of this Court.  On February 9, 2012, 
the District Court denied Knoll‘s motion for reconsideration.  It 
found both that Knoll had failed to comply with Local Rule 
7.1(e) and that her motion for a new trial was frivolous, citing 
the reasons it discussed in the memorandum opinion addressing 




Knoll appeals the District Court‘s dismissal of her motion 
for a new trial and subsequent denial of her motion for 
                                                 
1
 The District Court exercised subject matter jurisdiction 
over Knoll‘s federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  The 
District Court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over Knoll‘s 
state claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  Removal from the Court 
of Common Pleas was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1441.  We have 




reconsideration.  She argues that the District Court erred when it 
failed to consider the factors set forth in Poulis before 
dismissing and denying the motions, respectively, pursuant to 
Local Rule 7.1(e).  Because we hold that review of the Poulis 
factors is not required when a district court dismisses a post-trial 
motion for noncompliance with procedural rules or court orders, 
we will affirm. 
A 
Both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and a court‘s 
inherent authority to control its docket empower a district court 
to dismiss a case as a sanction for failure to follow procedural 
rules or court orders.  See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v); 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 
629–30 (1962).  Nevertheless, because we recognized that 
―dismissals with prejudice . . . are drastic sanctions,‖ Poulis, 747 
F.2d at 867, in Poulis we enumerated six factors
2
 a district court 
must consider before it dismisses a case pursuant to such 
                                                 
2
 The factors are:  
(1) the extent of the party‘s personal 
responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary 
caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders 
and respond to discovery; (3) a history of 
dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party 
or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the 
effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, 
which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; 
and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or 
defense. 
Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868 (emphasis deleted). 
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authority.  See id. at 868.  We have required consideration of the 
Poulis factors when a district court dismisses a case pursuant to 
Rule 37(b) for failure to respond to discovery, e.g., United 
States v. $8,221,877.16 in U.S. Currency, 330 F.3d 141, 145, 
161–62 (3d Cir. 2003); Hicks v. Feeney, 850 F.2d 152, 155–56 
(3d Cir. 1988), when a district court dismisses a case pursuant to 
Rule 41(b) for failure to prosecute, e.g., Dunbar v. Triangle 
Lumber & Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 128–29 (3d Cir. 1987), and 
when a district court enters a default judgment pursuant to Rule 
55(b) as a sanction for failure to plead or otherwise defend, e.g., 
Comdyne I, Inc. v. Corbin, 908 F.2d 1142, 1148 (3d Cir. 1990).  
In addition, we have required a Poulis analysis when a district 
court imposes sanctions that are tantamount to default judgment 
because they inevitably lead to liability for one party.  E.g., Ali 
v. Sims, 788 F.2d 954, 957 (3d Cir. 1986). 
Our application of Poulis in those contexts comports with 
the underlying concern Poulis sought to address, namely that 
dismissal as a sanction before adjudication of the merits 
deprives a party of her day in court.  This concern resonates 
throughout our precedents.  See, e.g., Adams v. Trs. of N.J. 
Brewery Emps. Pension Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 870 (3d Cir. 
1994); Livera v. First Nat’l State Bank of N.J., 879 F.2d 1186, 
1194 (3d Cir. 1989); Scarborough v. Eubanks, 747 F.2d 871, 
875 (3d Cir. 1984); cf. Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 
116, 131 (3d Cir. 2012) (Garth, J., dissenting) (citing the Poulis 
test as an example of the ―length to which we have gone in 
preserving cases for a merits determination‖). 
Likewise, the fact that we extended Poulis beyond cases 
in which there was an explicit order of dismissal to those cases 
in which alternative sanctions were tantamount to dismissal 
highlights our primary concern: to preserve the ability of the 
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parties to try their cases on the merits.  Thus, when sanctions 
effectively dictate the result, Poulis applies.  The converse is 
equally true; when sanctions do not preclude all claims or 
defenses such that a party still has her day in court, Poulis does 
not apply.  Compare Ali, 788 F.2d at 957–58 (requiring 
consideration of the Poulis factors because the sanction of 
deeming certain material allegations of plaintiff‘s complaint 
admitted led inevitably to liability for the defendant and thus 
was tantamount to default judgment), with Hagans v. Henry 
Weber Aircraft Distribs., Inc., 852 F.2d 60, 66 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(not requiring consideration of Poulis because, despite stiff 
sanctions, ―plaintiffs in this case still may establish liability on 
at least some, if not all, of their theories . . . . Unlike the 
defendants in Ali, plaintiffs here will still have their day in 
court.‖). 
In this appeal, Knoll implicitly urges us to extend Poulis 
to the post-trial context.  We decline to do so.  The concern 
animating Poulis—that dismissal will deprive a party of her day 
in court and preclude review of potentially meritorious claims—
does not apply in the post-trial context.  After all, the parties 
have already received an adjudication on the merits.  
Furthermore, although we acknowledge that, for instance, a 
dismissal of a motion for a new trial due to noncompliance with 
a procedural rule may deprive a party of an adjudication of that 
particular motion before the district court, it does not deprive 
that party of further review of the claims of error presented in 
such a motion.  Those claims, so long as they have been 
properly raised and preserved, would be ripe for review on 
appeal to our Court.  See Hewlett v. Davis, 844 F.2d 109, 115 
n.3 (3d Cir. 1988). 
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Moreover, in the post-trial context, other elements of 
sound judicial administration assume greater significance: the 
inherent authority of courts ―to manage their own affairs so as to 
achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases,‖ Link, 
370 U.S. at 630–31, and the existence of a final judgment that 
may be appealed, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4) (discussing the 
effect of a post-trial motion on a notice of appeal). 
Finally, although we are mindful that Poulis operates in 
some cases to protect innocent parties from bearing the 
consequences of their attorneys‘ mistakes, see Poulis, 747 F.2d 
at 868 (factors one and four), we also acknowledge that parties 
cannot always ―avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions 
of this freely selected agent,‖ Link, 370 U.S. at 633–34.  Indeed, 
the gravity of an attorney‘s errors in the post-trial context is 
mitigated because the parties have already received a merits 
determination on their claims and defenses.  Furthermore, we 
are confident that our Court will ensure that claims of error 
made in post-trial motions will receive appropriate review on 
appeal even when the post-trial motion itself is dismissed 
without consideration of the Poulis factors. 
For these reasons, we hold that a district court need not 
engage in a Poulis analysis when it dismisses a post-trial motion 
for noncompliance with procedural rules or court orders. 
B 
Although we hold that an analysis of the Poulis factors is 
not necessary in the post-trial context, we continue to adhere to 
the view that ―[d]ismissal must be a sanction of last, not first, 
resort.‖  Poulis, 747 F.2d at 869.  We review dismissal of a post-
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trial motion as a sanction for abuse of discretion.  See Hewlett, 
844 F.2d at 114. 
In this case, we cannot say that the District Court abused 
its discretion in dismissing Knoll‘s motion for a new trial and 
denying her subsequent motion for reconsideration.  First, the 
dismissal sanction was specifically authorized by Local Rule 
7.1(e), the validity of which Knoll does not challenge.  We have 
previously recognized that ―local rules play ‗a vital role in the 
district courts‘ efforts to manage themselves and their dockets.‘‖ 
Smith, 845 F.2d at 1184 (quoting Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 
757 F.2d 557, 570 (3d Cir. 1985)).  They ―facilitate the 
implementation of court policy, both by setting norms and 
putting the local bar on notice of their existence,‖ and ―serve to 
impose uniformity on practice within a district.‖  Id. 
Second, Knoll had ample time to comply with Local Rule 
7.1(e).  She was notified of her noncompliance by Allentown‘s 
response to her motion for a new trial on the fifteenth day after 
she filed the motion, and she still had not complied with the rule 
by the time the District Court dismissed the motion thirty-six 
days later.  Indeed, in dismissing the motion, the District Court 
specifically noted the fact that ―plaintiff did not order a 
transcript or file a verified motion showing good cause [to 
excuse that requirement] after the defendant cited the rule in its 
response to the motion for new trial.‖  Knoll‘s motion for 
reconsideration then remained pending for one year, four 
months, and twenty-three days before it was denied.  At no point 
did Knoll comply with the rule or even address why she had not 
complied.  Given Knoll‘s inaction, the District Court was well 




In an act of apparent desperation, Knoll accuses the 
learned trial judge of bias.  She points to two comments made in 
the District Court opinion denying Allentown‘s motion for 
sanctions as evidence of this bias: the opinion calls Knoll‘s case 
a ―silly case‖ and characterizes her motion for a new trial as 
―patently frivolous.‖  Knoll v. City of Allentown, 2011 WL 
4528336, at *1–2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2011). 
These comments are patently insufficient to support a 
claim of bias.  ―[O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of 
facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current 
proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis 
for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated 
favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment 
impossible.‖  Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).  
Knoll has failed to demonstrate the ―deep-seated favoritism or 
antagonism‖ that is required by Liteky.  The District Court‘s 
comments do not arise from an extrajudicial source and are 
―assessments relevant to the case, whether they are correct or 
not.‖  United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 220 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 As such, they do not demonstrate bias, even if they are 
―expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, [or] annoyance.‖  
Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555; see also Wecht, 484 F.3d at 220–21. 
IV 
For the reasons stated, we hold that a district court is not 
required to engage in an analysis of the Poulis factors before it 
dismisses a post-trial motion for noncompliance with procedural 
rules or court orders.  We will therefore affirm. 
